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The problem confronting The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the 
Department of Defense (DoD), and America’s private sector is how to collectively 
protect the nation’s critical infrastructure.  The challenge for the DHS is in motivating 
partnerships across the public, private, and DoD domains, each with different 
organizational and cultural objectives that are governed under a federalist system.  The 
relevance of this problem lies in the vulnerability of America’s economic and military 
foundations to terrorist attacks or a catastrophic natural disaster.  Research conducted of 
the regulated energy and water industries indicates federal standards can be effectively 
established across the public-private domains.  The establishment of federal tax and 
insurance incentives, limiting corporate liability, and developing industry standards may 
motivate increased security and circumvent excessive federal mandates.   
The conduct of public-private partnering is scrutinized via personal interviews 
with industry and DoD representatives to determine if the recommendation to build 
security partnerships with federal guidance is sufficient to secure critical infrastructure.  
The implementation of a dual-purpose strategy is recommended to further enhance the 
efficiency of security partnerships.         
This thesis suggests the DHS must develop an innovative CIP policy and utilize 
the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) as the vehicle to integrate and 
synchronize the actions of all security partners.  Research conducted on the influence of 
tax incentives and insurance indicates that offering financially-based incentive packages 
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I. OVERVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The events of September 11, 2001, made clear that our adversaries aim to destroy 
our economic agility and weaken our capability to extend national power from domestic 
DoD facilities to objectives across the globe.  How much federal exertion is necessary to 
protect critical infrastructure?  The President of the United States explicitly charged the 
Secretary of Homeland Security with securing the nation’s critical infrastructure and key 
assets in the subsequent federal legislation that followed 9/11.  The significant challenge 
in this endeavor has been to reach a productive level of cooperation that is amenable to 
both public and private entities. 
The fact that approximately eighty-five percent of the nation’s critical 
infrastructure is owned and operated by private enterprise is documented and is the basis 
of this dilemma.1  The DoD is tasked to secure the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) that 
provides the military establishment with federally owned and contracted services that 
produce weapon systems, munitions, and research and development.  How can the DoD 
ensure the security of the DIB when the overwhelming majority of the industrial utilities 
providing power, energy, telecommunications and water to military facilities are privately 
owned? 
 
B. DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
The author argues that the macro-challenge facing the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) is how to assimilate three distinct critical infrastructure (CI) domains 
collectively owned by the federal government and the private sector under a unified CIP 
policy.  Embracing public-private partnerships (P3) for the enhancement of security 
represents only two-thirds of the three CIP domains.  The other third, DoD, and for that 
matter the nation in general, has a vested interest in ensuring CI is functional to preserve 
national security and also provide a stable environment for the DIB to function. 
 
1 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, The National Strategy For The Physical Protection of 
Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets (Washington D.C: Government Printing Office February 2003), 8.   
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The strategic guidance established in the National Security Strategy and the 
Strategy for Homeland Security emphasizes the importance of partnering and promoting 
the benefits of information exchange between all levels of government and most 
importantly the private sector.  However, federal regulations such as the Strategy for 
Homeland Defense and Civil Support,2 The National Strategy For The Physical 
Protection of Critical Infrastructure And Key Assets,3 and specifically, Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive – 7 (HSPD-7),4 lack the mandate to ensure that civil-
military relations transcend periodic information sharing and promote genuine 
collaboration that strives to reach common objectives.   
Federal directives do not offer the engagement strategy for how federal agencies 
can guide the private sector in a consolidated effort to improve the DoD's critical 
infrastructure interdependencies.  Federal incentive could be the catalyst that energizes 
meaningful private sector engagement.  Unfortunately, little incentive for critical 
infrastructure partnering exists at this time.  The leadership at the local, state, federal, and 
private levels each has different and sometimes conflicting interpretations of how their 
respective organizations can reach their objectives.   
Current DHS policy lacks clarity in the division of labor between federal agencies 
and the private sector and has failed to unify the CI effort.  The question of whether or 
not critical infrastructure protection (CIP) strategy should be defined in terms of sectors 
or regions creates considerable and legitimate debate.  Domestic security is dependent on 
our ability to maintain economic continuity and ensure our ability to assure strategic and 
domestic military objectives remain readily available.  Common ground is not easily 
identifiable in this debate.  
How do we secure the DoD’s critical infrastructure when the forces of free 
enterprise stand between private business and federal regulation?  The DoD's ability to 
posture forces and maintain readiness remains largely dependent on commercial utilities 
 
2 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, The National Strategy For The Homeland Defense and Civil 
Support (Washington D.C: Government Printing Office, March 2005).  
3 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, The National Strategy For The Physical Protection of 
Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets (Washington D.C: Government Printing Office, February 2003). 
4 U.S. Department of Homeland Security,  Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and 
Protection: HSPD-7 (Washington D.C: Government Printing Office, December 2003). 
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and the industrial support provided by private enterprise.  The strategic agility of our 
military is dependent on the DIB, a conglomerate of mutually dependant military and 
civilian industrial facilities, programs, and services. 
1. The Relevance of This Problem 
The absence of federal guidance that presents a detailed public-private-DoD 
engagement plan increases the vulnerability of the nation’s CI to terrorist attacks and 
natural disasters.  The failure of the DHS to promote a comprehensive approach to 
securing defense, public, and private critical infrastructure can result in decentralized 
partnering efforts that are not nationally synchronized.  The emphasis on sector specific 
analysis in the ‘draft” NIPP neglects the assessment of cross-domain interdependencies 
by not implementing a regional perspective.  Information-sharing constraints between the 
public, private, and DoD domains are preventing collaboration that promotes meaningful 
partnerships. 
2. Thesis 
The nation's critical infrastructure (CI) policy remains deficient four years after 
the attacks of September 11, 2001. The primary reason for this is a deficiency in 
partnering among public, private, and DoD organizations.  The author argues that the gap 
between the federal government and private enterprise is the primary hindrance to 
genuine partnering.  Public, private, and DoD organizations need to: 
 
• Promote cross-domain partnering for CIP; 
• Consider federal regulation of CI security standards to ensure the 
interdependencies between the federal government and the private sector 
that facilitate national security and economic production remain secure;    
• Perform regional analysis in accordance with the “draft” National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan; 
• Consider tax incentives as fiscal motivation for corporate America to 
invest in security and common standards. 
 
3. Literature Review 
The preponderance of federal guidance dedicated to enhancing the security of 
defense programs and infrastructure explicitly details the roles and responsibilities of 
federal agencies and the programmatic criteria necessary to support and defend the 
4 
defense-industrial base.  The National Infrastructure Protection Plan, Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive-7, National Strategy for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure 
and Key Assets, and Strategy for Homeland Security clearly frame the importance of 
protecting national infrastructure, but neglect the sensitivity of federal agencies engaging 
private interests.  The Congressional Research Service and the Government Accounting 
Office have produced several studies that describe the federal grants and programs, 
background of critical infrastructure policy, and public-private partnering.  Unfortunately, 
only a modest amount of research exists that provides analytical recommendations for 
pursuing federal incentive as a vehicle to induce public-private engagement. 
4. Methodology 
This thesis will address the ambiguous nature of cross-domain partnerships by 
identifying the barriers that complicate collaboration and information sharing and 
propose innovative incentive-based alternatives.  Understanding the effectiveness of 
federal incentive programs designed to secure lines of communications between DHS, 
DoD, and the private sector is the core objective of this research.  The effect of 
introducing a federal incentive, used as a tool to energize the private sector’s desire to 
collaborate with federal agencies, is analyzed by assessing the following three factors:  
 
• Information gained via email correspondence and personal and telephone 
interviews regarding the effectiveness of partnering;  
• Organization and policy barriers specific to both public and private sectors 
that impede collaborative energy; 
• The federal guidance and DoD regulations that either promote or constrain 
the development of cross-domain partnerships. 
• In this thesis the author evaluates the following strategies:  
• Terrorism insurance and limited corporate liability; 
• Tax incentives;  
• Security standards; 
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II. PARTNERING 
Innovative partnerships like those being developed in the IPP [Innovative 
Partnership Program] can have consequences far beyond the research 
laboratory and the commercial marketplace.  They can form the basis of a 
space economy that can be the engine for carrying humanity out into the 
solar system and returning benefits to people back here on earth.5 Never 
any quote marks on formatted quotes 
 
A. DEFINING PARTNERING 
The concept of "partnering," in itself, is not complicated in terms of promoting 
unity of effort in securing critical infrastructure.  Partnering entails two or more entities 
collaborating to accomplish a common goal.  The conduct of public-private partnering, 
however, requires an understanding of the mechanisms that drive community relations, 
comparative advantage, government contracting, free enterprise, and one’s own 
proprietary limitations.  These are just a few of the intricacies that homeland security 
faces in the effort to secure critical infrastructure. 
The issues identified in Table 1 reflect the core constraints that inhibit partnering 
efforts across not only the broad spectrum of public and private industry but the 
contribution of the DoD as a integral security partner.   According to Ms. Nancy Wong, 
DHS, “The kind of public-private partnering we are talking about represents a major 
cultural change for all stakeholders.  The difference in language, ways of operating, 
expected mission results, and adaptability between government and private industry are 
wide, yet largely unrecognized.”6
The corporate and federal sectors both indicate that engaging public-private 
partnerships is worth the investment from the organizational perspective.  The partnering 
initiative is firmly imbedded in the business processes that link the DIB with local, state, 
federal, and private agencies and enable the military to support the objectives of our 
national strategy.  The United States Army Material Command (AMC) publishes the 
 
5 Dr. Frank Schowengerdt, Space Exploration: The Role of the Innovative Partnership Program, 
available at http://ipp.nasa.gov/innovation/innovation115/4-coverstory.html (Accessed on February 10, 
2006.)    
6 Email correspondence with Nancy Wong. 
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Partnerships for Success guide that not only defines partnering, but also clearly explains 
the legality, construct, and the process for the conduct of partnering "to enhance 
government-industry communication, teamwork and conflict."7  The AMC's emphasis on 
government-industry partnering serves as an enabler to circumvent a contract dispute 
before the dispute impedes the contractual process.  Since 9/11 the surge of commercial 
consultants offering products and services to the public has proliferated.   
Any agency, public or private, can obtain consultant advice via web instruction, 
in-person, through seminars or how-to handbooks.  The National Council of Public-
Private Partnerships (NIPPP), a non-profit corporation located in the District of 
Columbia, offers a more stringent approach to partnering by abiding by structured by-
laws that formally define conduct and admission to the NIPPP.8  The NIPPP defines 
partnerships as the following: 
A Public-Private Partnership is a contractual agreement between a public 
agency (federal, state or local) and a private sector entity. Through this 
agreement, the skills and assets of each sector (public and private) are 
shared in delivering a service or facility for the use of the general public. 
In addition to the sharing of resources, each party shares in the risks and 
rewards potential in the delivery of the service and/or facility.9  
The significance of the NIPPP approach is the establishment of formal by-laws 
and an organizational structure that enables its board of directors to enforce standards. 
The NIPPP has projected itself as a critical advocate of partnering by establishing a 
structured organization with criteria for admission and membership expectations. One 
could easily assume that collaborative ventures based on contract or mandate would far 
exceed the expectations of volunteerism.  Unfortunately, the notion of a membership 
bound by contract becomes significantly more complicated when attempting to join the 
engines of free market and nuances of defense critical infrastructure.  Table 1 summarizes 
the constraints inhibiting cross-domain partnering. 
 
7 Kenneth Bousquet and Mark Sagan, Partnering For Success:  A Blueprint For Promoting 
Government Industry Communication and Teamwork Available at 
http:://www.amc.army.mil/amc/command_counsel   (Accessed on November 15, 2005.) 
8 Creating Effective Public-Private Partnering for Buildings and Infrastructure in Today’s Economic 
Environment, available at http://wwwncppp.org/resources/papers/hdrp3whitepaper.pdf (Accessed on 
December 1, 2005.)   
9 Ibid.  
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Summary of Constraints to Cross Domain Partnering 
Issue Agency Impact 
Lack of federal and state 
incentives 
DHS, state The private sector has little 
or no financial justification 
to participate in CIP 
partnering initiatives. 
Federal mandates and/or 
regulation do not 
standardize majority of 
private sector security 
criteria 
Private sector The majority of the private 
sector is not legally bound 
by statutory regulation to 
adhere to federal standards 
for securing infrastructure  
Interdependencies between 
private industry and DoD 
installations 
DoD, Private sector, local, 
state, and federal  
DoD, private industry, and 
local municipalities are 
bound by services 
established by historical 
infrastructure.  However, 
federal regulations do not  
mandate private security or 
free market initiatives     
“Draft” NIPP is “sector” 
focused 
DoD, Private sector, local, 
state, and federal   
Projected comprehensive 
federal guidance will not 
include regional perspective 
on CIP analysis   
“Draft NIPP does not 
highlight DoD CIP 
DoD Private Sector does not 
recognize DoD as a 
potential or beneficial  
security partner  
 
Table 1. Summary of Partnering Constraints 
 
B. INTERDEPENDENCIES DICTATE PARTNERING 
In terms of geographic cohabitation, civilian and military relationships are created 
by the indiscriminate sharing of utilities and industrial systems whose functionality is 
dependant on one another's similar or dissimilar product.  Military facilities (posts, bases, 
stations, depots, etc.) commonly build supportive relationships with the civilian populace 
adjacent to or surrounding the installation.  The DoD presence is a catalyst for economic 
stimulation through employment and expenditure and additionally provides a means to 
support the local population in times of emergency.  
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The interdependencies established within a given communities infrastructure 
exemplify the essence of partnering.  Yet the organizational and cultural differences that 
separate private-enterprise and federal agencies often inhibit the collaboration that is as 
equally important as private-private partnering with the business community. 
DoD installations are generally a microcosm of their civilian municipalities and 
provide varying degrees of federally produced or managed services.  However, the DoD 
still requires vital utilities and industrial support from the private agencies that operate 
beyond the boundary of government property.  The same interdependencies that exist 
within the sector specific agencies (SSA) reflect the relationships between local corporate 
enterprise and DoD facilities. 
The Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-7 establishes "The 
Department and the Sector Specific Agencies will collaborate with appropriate private 
sector entities and continue to encourage the development of information sharing and 
analysis mechanism."10  Interdependencies demand information sharing and 
collaboration between civilian and military coordinators, planners, and most importantly 
leadership to ensure the uninterrupted continuity of resources critical infrastructure 
provides.  The urgency of the civil-military relationship is more pronounced when the 
nation’s strategic military readiness posture is jeopardized by either terrorism or natural 
disaster.  The premise of degraded critical infrastructure by any avenue of disaster 
undoubtedly invokes federal concern.   
 
C. DOES THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HAVE AN ENGAGEMENT 
STRATEGY FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR? 
The DoD assuredly has an engagement strategy for protecting federally owned 
critical infrastructure within the parameters of federal law enforcement and pertaining to 
DoD assets.  However, several stipulations prohibit the development of security 




10 U.S. Department of Homeland Security,  Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and 
Protection: HSPD-7 (December 2003).  
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with local and regional military installations should serve as justification to promote 
incentives for cross-domain partnering.   This section will briefly review the federal 
guidance that defines the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program and DoD partnering.    
The essence of Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3020.40, more 
commonly referred to as the Defense Critical infrastructure Program (DCIP), is the clear 
delineation of the roles and responsibilities for federal agencies in the conduct protecting 
critical infrastructure.11  The DoD strategic vision is stated in The Department of Defense 
Critical Infrastructure Protection Strategy:   
The DoD CIP vision (stated in the present tense) is to assure that the 
critical infrastructure assets on which DoD depends are always available 
to mobilize, deploy, command and control, and sustain military 
operations.  Operators have a real-time situational awareness of critical 
infrastructure assets.  Modeling and simulation reliably depicts the 
unfolding operational environment sufficiently well that accurate 
predictions of the operational environment occur in sufficient time to 
permit military operations, in anticipation of adversary action and/or 
adverse infrastructure events.12    
Vulnerability assessments for military facilities, and the more comprehensive 
defense industrial base, are conducted throughout the DoD via mostly regulated processes 
based on known standards.  The most important aspect of DoD critical infrastructure may 
be the fact that commanders of DoD installations are responsible for the control and 
security of all DoD critical infrastructures within their area of responsibility.  DoDD 
2000.12 states: 
Ensure AT (anti-terrorism) policies & programs include specific 
prescriptive standards to address specific terrorist threat capabilities & 
geographic settings, particularly regarding infrastructure critical to mission 
accomplishment and other DoD-owned, leased, or managed mission.13 
DoDD 2000.12 and other federal directives do not offer an engagement strategy 
for how federal agencies can collaborate with the private sector and consolidate the effort 
to improve the DoD's critical infrastructure interdependencies.  This shortcoming in 
 
11 U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 3020.40 (Washington, D.C.: 
Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP), August 19). 
12 Assistant Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Strategy (April 2003), 1  
13 U.S. Department of Defense. Directive, 2000.12 (August 18, 2003).   
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federal critical infrastructure policy is a major theme in the endeavor to understand the 
reality of cross-sector interdependencies in both the private and federal industrial 
architectures.  Ultimately, the federal government’s endeavor to secure the critical 
infrastructure that enables domestic and strategic military response is fractured by the 
proprietary needs of free enterprise and its own administration.  
The DoD’s ability to secure federally owned critical infrastructure is somewhat 
straightforward in comparison to how the private sector secures its business assets.  By 
law, the President can deploy federal troops under his Title 10 authority in response to 
intelligence indications or in response to a terrorist action or natural disaster.14  
Governors also have the ability to activate their state militias or national guard at their 
discretion under Title 32.15  The DoD holds a vested interest in ensuring non-DoD CI/KR 
is secure due to private industry’s contribution to the DIB.   
The development of federal guidance designed to bridge DoD CIP policy with 
DHS CIP policy has not transpired between the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 
Homeland Defense (ASD-HD) and DHS.  In essence, partnering has to occur at the 
federal level to ensure complementary CIP policies are designed that promote interaction 
between the DoD and private industry that is awarded defense contracts 
 
D. REGIONALIZATION 
The country needs a national homeland security system that mobilizes 
state and local governments and public safety officials as partners in 
intelligence, emergency response, and domestic counterterrorism.  For 
more effective coordination between these different levels of government, 
DHS should create regional field offices, as required by the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002. 16
The DHS emphasis on sector specific plans in the initial draft versions of the 
NIPP is a positive step in understanding sector specific vulnerabilities.  However, the 
 
14 U.S. Congress, Armed Forces (1956), Title 10 U.S Code, available at 
http://uscode.house.gov/download/pls/32T.txt, (Accessed on, October 10, 2005.). 
15 Ibid.  
16 James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Countdown to 9/11: Five Fixes for Homeland Security by the Fifth 
Anniversary of the Attacks, available at http://heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/wm963.cfm. 
(Accessed on February 10, 2006.)  
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identification of sector specific vulnerabilities alone does not contribute to the 
identification of critical nodes that survive on behalf of cross-sector interdependencies.  
Concentrating federal CIP guidance on primarily sector specific analysis addresses the 
initial challenge of promoting collaboration within peer industries but fails to promulgate 
the necessity to collaborate throughout a region.  A comprehensive understanding of a 
specific region’s CIP vulnerabilities requires an analysis of the full range of local or 
regional industry that forms that infrastructure’s critical nodes. 
Governors have sovereignty with their borders and are best suited to develop 
regional CI/KR.  Governors can in effect regulate their regions.  The significance of state 
sovereignty is important when recommending the implementation of regional CIP 
partnerships to identify and prioritize CI/KR.  The recommendation to identify states as 
regions for CIP is driven by the fact that once that service or industry transports products 
or services across the state line the governor’s sovereignty begins to erode and 
cooperative agreements have to be initiated.  A state can function as an autonomous 
region in terms of industry more effectively than a region that is comprised of two or 
more states.17
An article written by Philip E. Auerswald and Lewis M. Branscomb for the 
Journal of Technology discussed financing the transition from technical innovation to 
invention in the United States and how private investment in research and development 
matures.  Their research identified trends in the geographical location of technological 
start-ups and funding sources.  Most significant was the role state governments play in 
establishing regional environments that bridge the development of innovation to 
invention.18  Their research provided the following insight: 
State governments facilitate university-industry partnerships, leverage 
federal academic research funds by providing both general and targeted  
 
17 Telephone interview with Larry Clark, Public Sector Liaison, George Mason University, December 
7, 2005. 
18 Philip E. Auerswald and Lewis M. Branscomb, “Valleys of Death and Darwinian Seas: Financing 
the Invention to Innovation Transition in the United States,” Journal of Technology Transfer (August 
2003), 227. 
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grants, build a technically educated workforce through support of public 
colleges and universities, and ease regulatory burdens to create fertile 
ground for technology startups.19
Can regional environments within state borders expedite growth more readily than 
interstate relationships?  The Branscomb and Auerswald research indicates public-private 
partnering could be more readily fostered within state boundaries, based on the 
community relationships, regulatory commonality, and supportive population bases, than 
through exercising foreign relations with the neighboring state.  The consideration by 
DHS to supplement sector specific analysis with regional awareness in the CI/KR 
prioritization process offers an added dimension to the NIPP framework.  Consider the 
following insight by COL Mary Frels, J35, United States NORTHERN COMMMAND: 
DHS must look at CI from a state or geographical perspective as well as 
sector.  Governors are responsible in the civilian sector for the CI in their 
states.  Sectors represent functional interests; e.g. transportation, 
communications, etc.  These are often global.  But to a governor or to NC 
[NORTHERN COMMAND], we need to see the functional parts of CIP in 
relation to our AOR [area of responsibility]. The other problem with 
sectors is that they are stovepiped functional areas.  At some point we 
need to understand the impact of sectors on each other and the areas they 
represent.20
The perspective of USNORTHCOM CIP planners is valuable because they have 
no proprietary motivation and assess CI from the national to the local level.  In terms of 
the development of national CIP policy, prioritizing national CI/KR derived from both 
regional and sector information is beneficial. 
 
E. DUAL PURPOSE STRATEGY 
Dr. Ted Lewis, Naval Postgraduate School, frames the dual purpose concept as a 
security investment that simultaneously improves productivity.21  Balancing capital 
investment in CIP and the deliverables of a security partnership may not be readily 
 
19 Philip E. Auerswald and Lewis M. Branscomb, “Valleys of Death and Darwinian Seas: Financing 
the Invention to Innovation Transition in the United States,” Journal of Technology Transfer (August 
2003), 227.. 
20 Email correspondence: Colonel Mary Frels, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND. 
21 Dr. Ted G. Lewis, “Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security:  Defending A 
Networked Nation,” (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2004), 27. 
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identified by all stakeholders, whether private, public, or federal.  The determination of 
what qualifies as acceptable risk, vulnerability, or the prioritization of critical nodes can 
prove to be a difficult venture when the charter of any given partnership is narrowly 
defined.  The composite make-up of a cross domain partnership may indicate the amount 
of investment the partnership is able to recommend or the breadth of the CIP programs 
the partnership can even consider.  Therefore, a security partnership that restricts its own 
vision and membership diversity can therefore limit its full potential by inadvertently 
restricting its investment recommendations. 
The question Dr. Lewis asks is, “can an investment in security serve a dual 
purpose of also improving productivity?”22  Through securing the critical nodes of any 
given sector and decreasing the anomalies that drive higher costs, can a cost benefit be 
derived through lower insurance premiums?  The second and third order effects of 
investing in critical node security can result in network redundancy.  Accordingly, 
network redundancy mitigates risk and improves the efficiencies of that business unit.  
Thus infrastructure security and sector efficiency are served by a dual purpose strategy. 
Apply the same dual purpose concept to partnerships.  By expanding the 
membership of a cross-domain partnership to academia for example, the charter can 
leverage the benefits of research investment and innovation.  NASA’s Innovative 
Partnership Program (IPP) has found success in pursuing its cost-laden vision through 
leveraging partnerships with universities and private companies.  “In order to make those 
partnerships a reality, tough, potential industrial partners must be convinced that it is in 
their economic interests to put up their own money to help NASA get back to the Moon 
and go on to Mars.”23  The term outreach is relevant to describing the IPP’s vision.  The 
IPP goes as far as proclaiming that the end state of the IPP surpasses a mere partnership 
and goes as far as establishing a space economy.24  
 
22 Dr. Ted G. Lewis, “Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security:  Defending A 
Networked Nation,” (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2004), 27. 
23 Dr. Frank Schowengerdt, Space Exploration: The Role of the Innovative Partnership Program, 




                                                
The Alaska Partnership for Infrastructure Protection (APIP) is a CIP security 
partnership in our 50th state that applies dual purpose strategies for two distinct 
applications.  The first application is the aggregate assessment and prioritization of CI 
vulnerabilities by Alaska’s public, private, and DoD domains.  The partnership moves 
beyond public-private partnering and leverages Alaska’s DoD community as a 
formidable emergency response resource in the event of an incident of national 
significance.  The APIP has effectively bridged the cultural and organizational gap that 
can obscure the vital relationships of the interdependencies that exist between private and 
federal infrastructures. 
The second application of the APIP’s dual purpose strategy is encompassed in 
Alaska’s interagency information management process.  The APIP is a contributing 
member of the Alaskan civil-military agencies that facilitate interagency decision-
making.  The Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council Alaska (ATACA) serves as an 
information conduit that contributes intelligence analysis to the decision-making entities 
such as the Joint Coordination Group (JCG) and the Executive Committee (ExCOM) in 
the event of terrorist incidents or natural disasters.25
The APIP serves as a prime information engine that directly contributes to local 
and statewide situational awareness.  As benefactors to the APIP, the Anchorage 
Emergency Operations Center and the Alaska Joint Control Group can assess the health 
of Alaska’s critical infrastructure because of the APIP’s voice in the interagency 
committee.   Therefore, resources that are needed to ensure uninterrupted operation of 
critical services are apportioned by Alaska’s civilian and military leadership. 
The dual purpose strategy can embellish any partnership model for any state or 
region encompassing a military installation that has not pursued security partnerships.  
The benefit of leveraging public-private and military cooperation, prioritized 




25The State of Alaska has developed an interagency framework that addresses “all-hazards” 
prevention, detection, preparedness, response, and mitigation.  The APIP, ATACA, and IAG are joint 
agencies comprised of private, public, and DoD representatives that have established processes for 
interagency intelligence, information management, and statewide command and control.      
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III. REGULATION AND STANDARDS 
NCSL [National Conference of State Legislatures] recognizes the 
significant threat posed by terrorism and the subsequent need for increased 
homeland security.  NCSL believes it is necessary to strike a balance 
between the need for safety and the rights and freedom of democracy.  
NCSL further recognizes the demands this challenge places on the federal-
state partnership, especially as it relates to the vital role of state and local 
government in providing a secure homeland and stronger democracy.26
A. FEDERAL MANDATES FOR CIP 
Can federal mandates energize partnerships?  The question reverts to the 
argument of whether to rely purely on corporate volunteerism or to create an obligation 
through regulation as an approach to enhance CIP in a unified manner across domains.  
Generally, the prospect of federal regulation is not well embraced in terms of what is best 
for free-enterprise.  However, this chapter provides evidence that federal regulation is a 
common instrument that ensures the security of critical industries and the nation’s well-
being. 
The most direct approach available to the federal government in its effort to 
secure the nation’s CI is to mandate federal security measures.  The enactment of federal 
regulation would provide assurance that all sectors are adhering to federally accepted 
security standards to prevent acts of terrorism and mitigate the effects of natural disasters.  
The requirement to adhere to federal guidelines would not only establish a common 
framework for partnering, but would provide the mechanism to bridge the organizational 
gap inhibiting cross domain partnering as well.   
Historically, federal regulation is commonplace throughout American industries 
such as energy, transportation, and water.  So the prospect of regulations governing 
security would not be considered an extreme act of federal intrusion.  Nor would it be 
welcomed.  The desire of all three domains would undoubtedly be for market-based 
incentives to provide sufficient motivations that drive partnering and collectively increase  
 
 
26Task Force on Protecting Democracy, Recommendations for the Honorable Thomas Ridge, Director 
of Homeland Security, available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/press/2001/freedom/pd-fedrec.htm.  
(Accessed on, February 10, 2006.) 
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security.  However, in the unfortunate event that America suffers another terrorist attack 
or a natural disaster the deals a severe blow to national CI, the federal government 
reserves the right to invoke mandates.   
The following federal instruments can be considered as solutions for enhancing 
CI security and concurrently promoting partnering across domains.  
1. Invoking government regulation 
2. Emphasizing public-private partnerships 
3. Requiring insurance 
4. Security standards 
 
1. Invoking Government Regulation 
The notion of introducing federal regulations to invoke corporate adherence to 
national CIP standards is not appealing to private enterprise.  The task of identifying, 
assessing, remediating and prioritizing vulnerabilities is generally a matter of process 
with no concern for proprietary information being accessed by peer competitors via the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).27  The construct of the federal bureaucracy and its 
manifold administrative layers would have to merge with the self-perpetuating mechanics 
of free enterprise.  The private sector would shoulder the preponderance of effort in order 
to meet the information requirements and protocols necessary to meet the government's 
requirements. 
On Sep 29, 2005 CSPAN3 aired the "House hearings on public safety from 9/11 
to Katrina."  The hearings at one point focused on the need to expedite communications 
interoperability that would have enabled the public safety spectrum to support emergency 
management communications more readily during a disaster like Hurricane Katrina. 
Senator Chip Pickering, R-MI, offered a compelling question to a panel of 
 
27 U.S Department of Justice,  Freedom of Information Act of 1966, available at 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/foia/guide.html. (Accessed on November 1, 2005.)    
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telecommunications experts: "Should government wait a year for free enterprise to come 
up with something or induce a statutory mandate?"28
The same ultimatum is relevant in the quest to clearly define how public and 
private entities should engage in the development of critical infrastructure programs.  If a 
future catastrophic incident degrades defense critical infrastructure to a level that impedes 
national readiness, volunteerism may ultimately be relegated to just private-private 
partnering and more stringent federal actions may be implemented to solidify the 
foundations of public-private partnering. 
The federal regulations levied on the energy sector transmission through the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) serves as a prominent example of 
concerns for national security transcending the motivations of free-enterprise “The 
potential for terrorist attacks on the electric system has pushed secure operation of the 
grid into the federal policy arena from its traditional position as an industry 
responsibility.”29  Concurrently, the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) 
established by Presidential Decision Directive-63 (PDD-63) is chartered to oversee the 
reliability guidelines for the energy industry.30  The NERC does not have authority to 
regulate the industry per se but does influence the security guidance for the industry by 
conducting vulnerability analysis and developing mitigating plans.31  Even more 
obtrusive to the private sector is the FERC’s legal authority to access industry proprietary 
information under FERC Order 630.32  
Similarly, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) exercises considerable 
federal authority in the regulation of hazardous waste management and waste 
management facilities via the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).  The 
 
28 CSPAN3 aired the “House hearing on public safety communications form 9/11 to Katrina” on 
September 29, 2005. The panel included Kevin Martin, Chairmen, FCC, David Boyd, SAFECOM, and 
Vance Hitch, CIO, DoJ.  The implication of Senator Pickering’s question was that public safety 
communications were identified as a problem during 9/11 and again during Hurricane Katrina.  
http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/Hearings/09292005hearing1648/hearing.htm (CSPAN transcript.) 
29 Amy Abel, CRS Report for Congress, Government Activities to Protect the Electric Grid 
(Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress, February 4, 2005), 2. 
30 White House, Protecting America’s Critical Infrastructure: PDD-6 (1966). 
31 Ibid.   
32 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Final Rule,” Critical Energy Infrastructure Information.  
Order No. 630. Docket Nos. RM02-4-000-000 and PL02-1-000-000, February 21, 2003. 
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EPA delegates much of that authority to the states and distributes much of its budget 
through grants for improving environmental research. 
2. Emphasis on Cross Domain Partnerships (CDP) 
What are the criteria for CDP when federal guidance generally only recommends 
that civil-military partnerships should be developed in order to identify best practices and 
comprehend each other's vulnerabilities?  The melding of federal bureaucracy and free 
enterprise naturally invokes more negatives than positives.  The basic economic 
principles of return on investment and revenue in comparison to government’s calibrated 
pay scales and bureaucracy can lead to a conflict of interest.  The intent of the federal 
government to identify sector-specific risks cuts deep into the private sector's effort to 
guard their own vulnerabilities from peer competitors.  Thus, the notion of effective CDP 
really equates to how willing the private sector is to sit down at the table with federal 
agencies and discuss infrastructure interdependencies and mitigation.  Effective civil-
military partnering can still be accomplished depending on the relationships that are 
fostered within every community.  Unfortunately, the best practices and metrics of those 
partnerships will likely not be standardized due to the lack of mandate.  As a result, 
disparate partnerships may proliferate throughout the nation without a common 
framework to build upon. 
3. Requiring Insurance 
Can insurance be effectively mandated for the private sector as it is for other 
aspects of the economy?  For instance, “terrorism insurance” is required in order to 
safeguard lending institutions in the event of catastrophic loss.  The McCarren-Ferguson 
Act of 1945 delegates insurance regulation to the states for regulatory control.33  The 
federal government could provide an incentive to states to generate insurance mandates 
as it did for the REALID ACT.34  Levying insurance requirements, as some states require 
for vehicle liability coverage, could standardize building requirements and security 
 
33 United States Congress. McCarren-Ferguson Act of 1945. , available at 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode15/usc_sup_01_15_10_20.html. (Accessed on November 
15, 2005.) 
34 The Library of Congress. Real ID Act of 2005, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery.  
(Accessed on February 9, 2006.)  
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standards to increase security (An example of this is TRIA, the Terrorism Risk Insurance 
Act of 2002.). 
The ability of a business to recover financially following a disaster dictates 
whether or not it will continue in the market place.  Insurance is a critical aspect of 
recovery for the private sector and can also play an important role as an incentive to 
enhance building security and conversely serve as a prevention agent.  Many states 
require their citizens to maintain some level of automobile liability insurance to protect 
other drivers from financial distress if injured in an accident.  The same standard can be 
utilized in the promotion of security for physical structures.   
The insurance industry can promote compliance to security standards through the 
manipulation of rates. “A well-functioning insurance market plays a critical role in 
ensuring social and economic continuity when large-scale disaster occurs.  Private 
insurers paid about 90% of the $23 billion in insured losses that resulted from the four 
hurricanes that hit Florida in 2004.  Two-thirds of the $33 billion in insured losses from 
the 9/11 attacks were paid by reinsurance companies (mostly European) that operate at a 
larger level worldwide”35  The result of the massive payouts after 9/11 resulted in the 
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) which subsidized commercial insurers 
with federal funding.36   
The macro affect of TRIA was increased confidence throughout the private sector 
that insurers would be financially capable of distributing funds in the event of another 
catastrophic incident.  Therefore, the proposed motivation offered by insurance 





35Philip Auerswald, Lewis M. Branscomb, Todd M. La Porte, and Erwan Michel-Kerjan, “The 
Challenge of Protecting Critical Infrastructure,” Issues in Science and Technology Online, available at 
http://www.issues.org/issues/22.1. (Accessed July 2005.) 
36 U.S. Government Accounting Office,  Terrorism Insurance, Implementation of the Terrorism Risk 
Assurance Act of 2002, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04307.pdf. (Accessed on January 2, 
2006.) 
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4. Security Standards 
“Establishing standards” could be perceived as a federal mandate.  And although 
the endeavor to establish a common baseline for security would be difficult, it could be 
accomplished through critical infrastructure partnerships with the private sector taking 
the lead for establishing the security criteria. 
Government should be a participant in the standards setting process or 
take a role in areas that are aimed at protecting the public interest or laying 
the ground rules for a competitive market.  Government should advocate 
the greater use of voluntary consensus standards and should support that 
by broader participation by agency personnel in standards development.  
This aids the government in tackling its mandate to ensure public safety 
and health.37  
The establishment of industry-wide security standards can provide the insurance 
industry with baseline criteria and essentially motivate CIP through premium 
management. 
The author has already established that the federal government is committed to 
regulatory control of the energy and water sectors in order to ensure critical services are 
not interrupted.  Given that fact, other equally critical functions should be considered for 
federally-derived security standards if market-driven forces do not produce sufficient 
levels of security through incentive.  The following areas should be considered for 
enhanced federal regulation due to the magnitude of catastrophe possible as a result of 
compromise: 
• Chemical and biological plants; 
• Cyber-security; 




37 Richard Chace, Tax Incentives for Homeland Security Related Expenses (H.R. 3562), available at 
http://wwwc.house.gov/smbiz/hearings/databasedrivenhearingssystems/displaytestimony. (Accessed 
December 15, 2005.)   
38 Peter Orszag identified chemical and bio plants, large buildings, and cyber-security as three areas 
for developing security standards during the Subcommittee on Rural Enterprises Agriculture and 
Technology, 21 July, 2004.    
21 
B. A MORE ASSERTIVE NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 
PLAN (NIPP) 
The draft NIPP was distributed nationally by the Department of Homeland 
Security on October 13, 2005 for the nation to review and comment.  The final NIPP will 
inevitably provide the roadmap for how local, state, and federal entities approach and 
execute CIP programs.  Therefore, this plan could serve as the definitive federal CIP 
guidance that could ultimately bridge the gap between the public, private, and DoD 
domains.  But will it provide a universal framework for building partnerships and present 
the assertive federal guidance that promulgates the development of an engagement 
strategy?  The engagement strategy can only be successful if it is embraced by all three 
domains.  In order for the NIPP to arrive at innovation, several areas of CIP should be 
considered as parallel initiatives that address the concerns circulating throughout active 
partnerships.  The distribution of the draft NIPP was intended to garner input from all 
three domains and, for that matter, any entity that has a vested interest in securing CI.  
The author will summarize what he determines are injections to the final NIPP. 
1. The Draft NIPP does not Emphasize the Relationship Between the 
DoD and Explain the Interdependencies Associated with the Public 
and Private Industries 
Private industry and DoD installations are intimately reliant on one another for 
infrastructure/industry resources (telecommunications, energy, water), installation 
support, and community relationships.  DoD installations and local private industries are 
mutually supportive during emergency management, specifically in support of an 
incidence of national significance (INS) and largely benefit from cooperation.  The NIPP 
can serve as the definitive document that decreases the divide between public-private 
partnering.  The federal mandates in HSPD-7 are in direct conflict with the foundations 
of free enterprise.  Understandably, the divide between the DoD and private industry will 
never close (despite contractual security requirements embedded in the defense industrial 
base). 
However, emphasizing the important relationship between private industry and 
DoD installations is critical to not only the fluidity of local, state, and federal emergency 
management during INS, but the strategic assets that provide for the nation’s security.  
The NIPP can place greater emphasis on the interdependencies associated with the 
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private sector and DoD installations.  The DoD’s reliance on local industry for critical 
infrastructure and the private industry’s reliance on federal resources in the conduct of 
homeland security, and to a greater extend an incidence of national significance, should 
be addressed in greater detail. 
2. The Draft NIPP should Explain the Significance of Integrating State 
and Local Security Assets to Secure Nationally Identified Critical 
Infrastructure 
The private sector continues to seek tangible local, state, and federal resources to 
protect commercial infrastructure that is deemed nationally critical.  The main effort for 
private sector security planning is relegated to state Title 32 (National Guard) assets, 
based on their authority to exercise law enforcement when local and state police are 
occupied with more proactive actions during periods of heightened security.   
Therefore, private industry projects an expectation that state assets should 
augment commercial facilities that are designated as national infrastructure.  The NIPP 
should address in greater detail what the connotation of “state resources” entails.  The 
expectation of law enforcement augmenting private security (i.e., personnel and 
technology) should be addressed to include the possible role of state Title 32 assets 
and/or militias. 
3. The Draft NIPP Fails to Explicitly Address the Proprietary Concerns 
of the Private Sector or Recommend Corporate Best Practices for 
Information Sharing 
The process of identifying critical infrastructure, whether DoD or private, requires 
acknowledgement and analysis of inter/intra-dependencies by all security partners.  The 
proprietary concerns of a business unit can arguably be the primary obstruction to the 
conduct of fluid partnering.  This aspect of partnering does not apply to federal or DoD 
entities as comparative advantage is generally not a concern.  Proprietary awareness is 
paramount in the development of sector specific analysis and prioritization under the 
guise of partnering.   
For example, the security partnerships established by the Alaska Partnership for 
Infrastructure Protection (APIP) inadvertently utilized DoD representatives as “honest 
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brokers” and found success by mediating the proprietary concerns of the private sector.39  
The NIPP should incorporate language that acknowledges the extent of the sensitivity 
surrounding the proprietary concerns of private industry and emphasize that common 
ground has to be identified within the sector to attain legitimate prioritization. 
4. The Draft NIPP Fails to Promote the Benefit of Developing Innovative 
State or Federally Sponsored Incentives to Motivate CIP Partnering 
Promoting state CIP programs through direct fiscal incentive could energize the 
private sector in concert with the Buffer Zone Protection Program (BZPP).  The BZPP 
sidesteps private incentive by funding municipal security initiatives.  The ability to offer 
the private sector fiscal incentive (for example man hours devoted to state CIP, or tax 
incentives for participating in state CIP or more innovative programs) are more beneficial 
to obtaining “buy-in” from private industry. The NIPP should emphasize the need for 
local, state, and federal agencies to develop innovative incentive programs that directly 
impact the private sector. 
This chapter addressed the effects of federal regulation, insurance and 
establishing security standards as vehicles for promote the protection of national CI.  The 
challenge for DHS is how to arrive at the right mixture of programs that are unobtrusive 
for free enterprise yet dynamic enough to be accepted by all three domains.  
Concomitantly, the final NIPP can prove tremendously beneficial as the vehicle to 
provide the public, private, and DoD domains with explicit knowledge for how to 
develop cross domain partnerships.  Decisive wording in the final NIPP, in concert with 
innovative federal programs, can serve as the bridge that spans organizational and 
environmental gaps hindering cross-domain partnering. 
 
 
39 The author observed during preliminary meetings with Alaska’s telecommunications sector that 
proprietary concerns were significant enough to inhibit information sharing.  Mediation between peer 
competitors on a “one-on-one” basis alleviated the majority of the anxiety generated when sensitive 
























                                                
IV. INCENTIVE AND TAXATION 
A. WHAT INCENTIVE? 
The federal government is historically aggressive in regulating the private sector’s 
governance of the energy, water, and transportation industries to ensure critical services 
are reliable and provide needed support to the nation.  It would appear obvious, then, that 
mandates are inevitable if the federal concern for CIP is elevated to level of drinking 
water or air quality.  Could the specter of federal security mandates inadvertently become 
the incentive for corporations to pursue partnerships and invest capital in anti-terrorist 
technologies or the continuity of operation policy?   
Some segments of the private sector are not as heavily regulated as the energy or 
transportation sector; this creates an unbalanced playing field for DHS in synchronizing 
CIP policy.  Conversely, HSPD-7 currently provides all federal agencies with the 
guidance and mandate to assess and prioritize critical infrastructure and the projected 
final version of the NIPP will further clarify sector specific roles, responsibilities and 
processes.   
Yet because 80-85% of the nation’s CI is owned by private entities, a significant 
amount of corporate cooperation and information sharing would consequently be 
expected to ensure all three domains arrive at synchronized best practices.40 Perhaps the 
most significant aspect of this dilemma is our federalist system that stipulates the 
separation of free enterprise and government regulation.  That leaves DHS in a quandary 
over how to develop incentives for partnering and collaboration that in affect 
simultaneously abide by federal guidance and free enterprise.  As Joseph A. Pechman, 





40U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Draft National Infrastructure Protection Plan Base Plan, 
November 2, 2005. 
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To be sure, private firms currently have some incentive to avoid the direct 
financial losses associated with a terrorist attack on their facilities or 
operations.  In general, however, that incentive is not compelling enough 
to encourage the appropriate level of security – and should therefore be 
supplemented with stronger market-based incentives in several sectors.41   
Various sectors – more specifically the telecommunications sector – acknowledge 
that a predetermined level of risk is acceptable in terms of degradation of loss of business 
assets and capital as a result of natural disaster or terrorism.42  The reluctance to invest 
heavily in critical infrastructure protection may be a result of corporate efficiency by 
virtue of organic disaster preparedness plans and redundancies built into their business’ 
infrastructure. 
How then does DHS secure America’s infrastructure when it cannot legally 
impose mandates on the majority owners of CI?  The current solution of offering DHS 
grants fails to qualify as a meaningful private incentive.   
The fiscal year 2005 Buffer Zone Protection Program (BZPP) was approved by 
the President on October 18, 2004, when he signed the Fiscal Year 2005 Homeland 
Security Appropriations Act.43  This program provides funding for states and 
municipalities to invest in equipment and assets authorized by the Office of Grants and 
Training and in conjunction with the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 
(IAIP) Directorate to secure or enhance security of CI.  The objective of the BZPP is to 
assist municipalities in extending the protected boundary of CI, therefore assisting first 
responders.44 The private sector does not receive BZPP funding; municipalities do.  And 
although the BZPP investment can enhance the security of the overall community, it may 
not justify the corporate investment in time and capital expense put into partnering.   
 
41Peter R. Orszag, Critical Infrastructure Protection and the Private Sector:  The Crucial Role of 
Incentive, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science, and Research & Development 
and the Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security.  House Select Committee on Homeland 
Security, September 4, 2003.  
42The March 2005 Interagency and Critical Infrastructure Tabletop exercise (TTX) identified 
significant redundancy built into the telecomm sector in Alaska, further secured by intra-sector mutual aid 
agreements to support peer competitors in the event of network degradation. 
43 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Fiscal Year 2005 Buffer Zone Protection Program 
Guidelines (Washington, D.C.:2005). http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/fy05bzpp.pdf
44Ibid.  
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For example, the State of Alaska was awarded $550,000 in BZPP funds for fiscal 
year 2006.45 Given the geographical size of Alaska and the criticality of oil and gas 
production and international commerce, $550,000 is not an extravagant sum of money to 
cover the cost of technical applications and hardware.  The $550,000 is further distributed 
with a limit of $50,000 per jurisdiction, allowing the state the option to decrease or 
increase specific sites as long as the state does not exceed the $50,000 limit per site.  The 
administrative requirements are cumbersome and include regulatory requirements to 
monitor and report the execution of the BZPP.46  
The question is posed again: what incentive?  Although the BZPP contributes 
varying levels of DHS funding according to prioritized criteria, it does little to promote 
cross domain partnering.  The crux of the problem is incentive.  What mechanisms can 
persuade private enterprise to unreservedly collaborate and share information with their 
peer competitors, local, state, and federal leadership, and, in some instances, members of 
the DOD? 
 
B. TAX INCENTIVES 
The author makes the assumption that if direct incentive is offered to the private 
sector to participate in CIP partnering initiatives then America’s infrastructure will 
become more secure.  Based on the stake holders’ concern for their investment in a 
particular business unit, market incentives would play a vital role in motivating the 
private sector.  A prime example of how the federal government can influence a specific 
market is the offering of incentives to the energy markets to develop renewable energy 
(wind generated) projects in the 1990s.   
Federal incentives were provided via a production tax credit established by the 
Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPACT).47   The EPACT offered a 1.5¢ per kilowatt hour of 
electricity produced.  The monetary effects of this credit were significant over the 
lifespan of the project.  “The production tax credit was valued at more than $20,000,000  
45U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Fiscal Year 2005 Buffer Zone Protection Program 
Guidelines (Washington, D.C.:2005). http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/fy05bzpp.pdf
46 Email correspondence, Wayne Rush, State of Alaska Homeland Security & Veterans Affairs. 
47Mark Gielecki, Fred Mayes, and Lawrence Prete, Forces Behind Wind Power, available at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/solar.renewables/rea_issues/incent.html. (Accessed December 20, 2005.) 
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in 1998.”48  The macro effects of EPACT forced the power industry to adjust as the 
market debated lower-cost fossil fuels or higher-cost environmentally-friendly renewable 
power sources motivated by the tax credit. In essence, federal incentive was the catalyst 
for the restructuring of the electric power industry and the shift toward a new source of 
energy.49  
Creative tax incentives are found beyond the realm of industry.  The National 
Park Service has also had success offering tax incentives as a means to promote the 
preservation and revitalization our nation’s historical buildings through the Historic 
Preservation Tax Incentives program.  “The program fosters private sector rehabilitation 
of historic buildings and promotes economic revitalization.  It also provides a strong 
alternative to government ownership and management of historic properties.”50  This tax 
incentive has encouraged private investment since 1976 and is governed by standards 
established by the Secretary of Interior.51
The impact of 9/11 levied a demand on privately owned businesses to invest in 
enhanced security technology to protect the business unit.  The investment in security 
technology can quickly drain the capital of small businesses and often includes recurring 
costs. 
Congressman Bill Shuster (R-Penn.), introduced H. R. 3562 (also known as the 
Prevent Act of 2003).  This legislature amended the IRS code to allow a business tax 
credit of up to twenty percent for the purchase and implementation of security devices, 
and a thirty percent credit for assessments and other expenses incurred to improve 
security.52  The introduction of tax credits to improve anti-terrorism measures can lessen 
the financial burden and enable the purchase of biometric technology, closed circuit 
television, and barrier equipment to increase the level of security for the private sector. 
 
48 Mark Gielecki, Fred Mayes, and Lawrence Prete, Forces Behind Wind Power, available at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/solar.renewables/rea_issues/incent.html. (Accessed December 20, 2005.) 
49 Ibid., 2. 
50 U.S. National Park Service,  Historic Preservation Tax Incentives, available at 
http://www.cr.nps/hps/tps/tax/. (Accessed on January 4, 2006.) 
51 Ibid.  
52 108th Congress 1st Session.  H.R 3562, To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow 
businesses a credit for security devices, assessments, and other security related expenses.  (November 20, 
2003). 
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C. PETER R. ORSZAG: TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON 
CYBERSECURITY, SCIENCE, AND RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT 
AND THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INFRASTRUCTURE AND BORDER 
SECURITY.  SEPTEMBER 4, 2003 
Peter R. Oszag, of The Brookings Institution, offered noteworthy testimony in 
front of the House Select Committee on Homeland Security with regards to the role of 
incentives for the protection of critical infrastructure.  His remarks highlighted the role of 
market incentives as a tool to reduce security risks, versus the expectations of the private 
sector to invest voluntarily.  The author regards this data as the most relevant data 
acquired in this research. 
Should the security of America’s infrastructure, and consequently the security of 
Americans, be afforded the government’s commitment to deregulate private markets?  
Federal innovation could feasibly be the catalyst that motivates the captains of industry to 
participate in public-private partnering through financial incentive.  The key is to find the 
right balance, because “Private markets themselves do not generate sufficient incentives 
for homeland security.”53  Orszag highlights seven reasons why private markets by 
themselves do not generate sufficient incentive and why governments should intervene: 
• National sovereignty cannot be quantified.  A significant terrorist attack 
undermines the nation’s sovereignty, just as an invasion of the nation’s 
territory by enemy armed forces would.  The cost associated with a 
reduction in the nation’s sovereignty or standing in the world may be 
difficult to quantify.  In other words, the costs of the terrorist attack extend 
well beyond the immediate areas and people affected; the attack imposes 
costs on the entire nation. 
• Negative externalities. The government could reduce the risk of terrorist 
attacks by reducing the overall vulnerability of high payoff targets such as 
chemical or explosive plants that may supply the sources for a terrorist 
incident in another location. 
• Contamination effects.  Contamination effects arise when a catastrophic 
risk by one firm is determined in part by the behavior of others.  
• Accurate evaluation of security standards.  The cost of accurately 
evaluating security measures across a broad spectrum of facilities could be 
cumbersome.  Establish standards, codes or minimum guidelines for 
building security.   
 
 
53 Orszag, Critical Infrastructure Protection, 2.  
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• Corporate and individual financial loss.  Corporate and individual 
financial exposures to the losses from a major terrorist attack are 
inherently limited by the bankruptcy laws.  Since the outcome for the 
firm’s owners would not depend on the severity of the attack, the firm 
would have little or no incentive to reduce the likelihood of the more 
severe version of the attack, even if the required preventive steps were 
relatively inexpensive. 
• Expectation of a government bailout.  Private firms, expecting the 
government to bail them out should an attack occur, do not undertake as 
much security as they would otherwise.  If the government cannot credibly 
convince the private sector that no bailouts will occur after an attack, it 
may have to intervene before an attack to offset the adverse incentives 
created by the expectation of a bailout. 
• Complete markets.  Government involvement may be warranted to fulfill 
imperfections in the capital and insurance markets.54 
The nuances of government incentive and intervention can be complicated when 
the analysis considers all the ramifications for the private sector.  In his testimony, 
Orszag details his advice that the government provide added security for buildings by 
taking the following actions. 
• Impose direct regulation for the inclusion of anti-terrorist building 
features. 
• Require terrorism insurance for every public and private entity. 
• Subsidize anti-terrorism efforts through direct government spending or 
tax-incentive. 
Capital investment committed to securing CI is undoubtedly a step in the right 
direction.  The question is, can direct government spending or tax incentives alone 
promote cross-domain partnering?  A solution lies in the return on investment that 
appeases stakeholders combined with the residual market effects of tax-incentives.  In 
order for stockholders to condone corporate involvement in CIP partnerships, the 
incentive must be direct and financially motivating.  If corporations are reimbursed or 
funded for man-hours invested in the conduct of partnering, then an acceptable obligation 




       54 Orszag, Critical Infrastructure Protection, 2. 
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The importance of CIP, given the known threat of terrorism, justifies tax-
incentive programs that are designed to promote private investment in security hardware, 
applications, and training.  Tax incentives offered as a catalyst to promote CIP can 
directly compliment partnering initiatives by establishing new market trends in the 
security industry.  The proliferation of security technologies can subsequently be used as 
leverage to integrate partnerships linked by sector interdependencies, hence motivating 
























This thesis makes two overarching arguments.  First, building cross-domain 
partnerships is better than relying on corporate volunteerism.  Second, regional CIP 
collaboration is better than sector-specific analysis.  The author further argues that the 
best way to achieve collaboration between the private sector, government, and the 
military is to develop security standards, incentivize insurance policies, and consider tax 
incentives to motivate investment in CIP programs.  These claims are based on in-depth 
analysis of CIP partnering, regionalization, taxes, insurance, and standards as they have 
been applied to other related problematic areas of federal responsibility.  The author’s 
initial concern represents the root problem of the partnering dilemma:  the definition of 
partnering itself.  
 
A. DEFINE PARTNERING 
Several definitions of partnering were provided as a starting point for this thesis 
to emphasize the proliferation of partnering initiatives throughout the nation.  Current 
federal guidance and constitutional law tell us that partnering cannot be mandated by the 
government to enhance the security of DoD and/or privately owned critical infrastructure.  
Conversely, the expectation of corporate volunteerism should not be relied on as the 
bedrock for any policy because volunteerism does not constitute an obligation that 
ensures long-term bonds or mandates collaboration and information sharing.  Each 
domain offers its own interpretation of partnering that is invariably formed by either 
geographic alliances or market forces, ultimately suggesting that partnering is an 
ambiguous endeavor.   
Critical infrastructure partnerships, regardless of domain, should be defined by the 
intra/interdependencies that induce cross sector relationships and span all three domains.  
The cascading effects of the 2003 northeast region power outage, for example, make the 
case that interaction within peer communities and across sectors and domains is 




                                                
toward America and its critical infrastructure does not warrant the time needed for market 
trends to dictate CIP strategies.  Expeditious and innovative solutions that assist cross-
domain engagement should be buttressed by assertive DHS doctrine. 
Ironically, the January 2006 NIPP Base Plan does not offer a definition of 
partnerships or partnering in its Glossary of Key Terms.55  Opponents of a DHS-derived 
definition of partnerships could argue that partnerships are proliferating without the 
assistance of federal definition, so why project more federal guidance?  Consider the 
excessive amount of energy initially put forth by public, private and DoD leadership in 
Anchorage AK, to build the Alaska Partnership for Infrastructure Protection.  The 
contribution of a federal CIP partnering definition as a starting point for their charter 
would have greatly expedited the formulation of that security partnership by establishing 
the fundamental objectives of CIP.  Therefore, as a catalyst for national partnering 
initiatives, the DHS should advocate the significance of integrating the three domains for 
CIP, develop a standard definition for cross-domain partnering, and include that 
definition in the final NIPP. 
 
B. SECURITY STANDARDS 
The most expeditious, yet controversial, method to promote security partnerships 
could be federal regulation of security standards.  Standards are both market-driven and 
mandated by the government, bottom-driven and top-fed.  The energy, oil, and water 
industries have a long history of federal regulation enforcing sector-wide compliance for 
security and operations.  The DHS’s Protective Security Division (PSD) is working in 
conjunction with the Electric Power Research Institutes (EPRI) to develop an 
International Standards Institute (ISO) compliant high-voltage recovery transformer that 
can be readily transported.56  The author’s discussions with Alaska’s corporate and public 
telecomm sector, and research in the area of federal mandates, indicate additional  
regulation would be unwelcome.  Redundant communications architectures within the 
 
55 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, Base Plan, Revised 
Draft NIPP Ver.2 (Washington, D.C.: January, 2006), 7. 
56 Amy Abel, CRS Report for Congress: Government Activities to Protect the Electric Grid  
(Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress, February 4, 2005), 5.    
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Alaska’s telecomm sector and mutual aid agreements amongst carriers mitigate the 
effects of a single point of failure. 
The Department of Defense’s reliance on military doctrine as the foundation for 
its operational efficiency exemplifies the importance of deriving common standards to 
support organizational objectives.  Universal standards and common language serve as 
enablers in large organizations.  Correspondingly, DHS mandated security standards 
developed in conjunction with industry sectors would provide security partnerships with 
the ability to assess industry-wide data across sectors, regions, and the DHS. 
As a result of DHS, and more specifically industry, not establishing common 
security standards, contrasting security and disaster recovery programs are dispersed 
throughout the sectors.  The result of the latitude and ambiguity left to the interpretation 
of discreet CIP partnerships may ultimately dictate the speed with which federal 
standards are considered if market forces do not develop security standards before the 
next catastrophic incident. 
 
C. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
The DHS has to arrive at a consensual incentive package that directly appeases 
the private sector’s stakeholders and genuinely promotes partnering throughout the 
public, private, and DoD domains.  The research included in this thesis makes three 
recommendations that can promote security partnerships and subsequently increase the 
security of national CI. 
1. Provide assertive language in the NIPP that emphasizes public-private-DoD 
partnerships. 
2. Promote regionalization to understand cross-sector and cross-domain 
interdependencies.  
3. Provide innovative CIP incentive packages that include: 
• Security standards; 
• Insurance; and 




                                                
1. The NIPP 
The final NIPP is the definitive DHS vehicle to emphasize the importance of the 
private sector collaborating and sharing information with its contiguous DoD community.  
The array of deployable resources projected by the DoD and its management of the 
defense-industrial base is critical to the security of this nation, as is privatized 
infrastructure.  The NIPP can serve as the conduit to bridge the challenges and limitations 
that encompass public-private-DoD partnering.  The term “partnering” must be defined 
with concise guidance and incentive within the NIPP to invoke genuine teamwork to 
prioritize infrastructure in order to direct local, state, and federal resources to secure what 
is critical to the nation’s security.  The motives and nuances of private sector partnering 
with DoD deserve special recognition in the final NIPP. 
2. Regionalization 
Geographic regionalization is the preferred solution to maximize the overall 
effectiveness of security partnerships.  The sovereignty of the state governor and the 
commerce boundaries within a given state establish the optimal security environment for 
identifying and prioritizing CI vulnerabilities and critical nodes.  The sector-specific 
guidance and framework defined in the NIPP Base Plan serves as the basis for planning 
and analysis, but remains sector-centric.  A comprehensive analysis of what a state region 
produces and supports is relevant to understanding the foreseeable risks that can be 
mitigated once interdependencies are understood.  To highlight the efficiency of 
regionalization, consider this justification, offered by International Association of 
Business Communications.  
The unwieldy eight districts nationwide are being consolidated into three 
larger regions that will be able to provide a plethora of services that might 
not have been available in the past.  The consolidation also opens the door 
for sharing best practices among different chapter leaders that will prove 
to make all chapters stronger.  The result is a better value for all local 
chapter members.57
The Alaska Partnership for Infrastructure Protection (APIP) model offers 
additional proof that cross-domain partnerships incorporating a regional perspective  
57 Camille Downing, Regional Leadership Opportunities, Opportunities Abound In New IABC 
Heritage Region.  Available at http://www.isbcpittsburgh.com/leadership/index.jsp. (Accessed January 14, 
2006.) 
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collectively reinforce prevention, preparedness and recovery policy on a statewide scale.  
Understanding the sector-specific nuances of peer relationships is critical to the 
formulation the security partnerships.  However, in the case of the APIP, progress was 
further advanced by assessing the state’s sector-specific vulnerabilities with regional 
vulnerabilities.  The APIP’s ultimate objective was met by producing a statewide 
prioritized listing of CIP vulnerabilities; this could not have been achieved by focusing 
purely on sector-specific vulnerabilities. 
3. Incentive Packages 
Financial incentives can individually, or as an amalgam, produce sufficient 
motivation for the private sector to engage in partnerships and invest in security.  The 
relationship between federally-mandated security standards and insurance is 
complimentary.  Participation in CIP security partnerships can be motivated by offering 
reduced disaster or terrorism insurance premiums for entities that engage in CIP 
initiatives.  The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) of 2002 was extended to 2007 
under legislation introduced by Senator Christopher Dodd and approved on November 
18, 2005.58   Many modifications were built into the TRIA-Extension Act of 2005 that 
offers risk mitigation for the private sector through the manipulation of premiums.59  If a 
business unit complies with security standards or joins a security partnership, and 
subsequently reduces corporate liability, then an obligation to remain a security partner 
begins to solidify. 
Research provided in this thesis suggests that tax incentives are monetary 
catalysts that can affectively promote the migration of policy and attitudes.  Peter Oszag 
refers to this amalgamation as a “mixed system” of incentives and suggests that just one 
approach is insufficient.  “A mixed system has the advantage of being flexible, a key 
virtue in an arena where new threats will be “discovered” on an ongoing basis.”60   The 
strength of tax incentives can be summarized in the U.S. Department of Interior’s 
Historic Preservation Tax Incentive Program.  Since 1976, The Historic Preservation Tax 
 
58 Baird Webel, CRS Report for Congress: Terrorism Risk Insurance Legislation:  Issue Summary and 
Side-by-Side (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, updated, January 11, 2005). 
59 Ibid, 7. 
60 Peter R. Orszag,  “Tax Incentives for Homeland Security Related Expenses” (H.R. 3562), available 
at http://wwwc.house.gov/smbiz/hearings/databasedrivenhearingssystems/displaytestimony. (Accessed 
December 15, 2005.) 
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Incentive Program has rehabilitated more than 32,000 historic properties, stimulated over 
thirty-three billion dollars in private investment, rehabilitated more than 185,000 housing 
units, and created over 140,000 housing units.61  In this case, tax incentives have 
profoundly motivated investment and provided a catalyst for the federal government to 
promote the specific national objective of revitalizing historical structures. 
Tax incentives may promote expenditure on equipment or systems that are 
inherently designed to deter vandalism, as opposed to technical solutions designed to 
deter or prevent terrorism.  The definition of anti-terrorism equipment may require 
refinement to avoid what could be viewed as wasteful spending.  At the national level, 
tax reform and spending on homeland security programs remain a delicate topic and 
would certainly draw debate as the taxpayers are the ultimate bill payers.  The easing of 
taxes on the private sector for security enhancement could easily beg the question: Why? 
We have not been attacked since 9/11.  The levying of a security tax on consumers of 
specific resources that are produced by CI can inadvertently disrupt free enterprise.  A 
corporation’s competitive advantage in a specific market can be affected if the population 
does not share the same concern for security as the federal government – particularly if 
that market area is not categorized as a national priority. 
A solution is rooted in both financial enticement and impending federal 
regulation.   The federal government and the private sector need to successfully navigate 
the forces of free enterprise in order to find common ground that appeases stakeholders 
who do not find securing critical infrastructure worthy of capital investment.  Initially, 
this approach translates to public-private engagement with the objective of identifying 
what incentives are meaningful to corporate leadership and stakeholder alike.  The 
federal government must research the offering of fiscal incentives to offset the minimal 
man-hours that will be devoted to collaboration.  The government's goal is to invoke a 
more substantive private approach to collaboration with federal agencies through fiscal 
incentive.  And although historical research and studies on what incentives effectively 
promote cross-domain partnerships is limited, the question of what actually is an 
incentive continues to be asked in public, private, and DoD forums.  Therefore, the 
 
61 U.S. National Park Service, Historic Preservation Tax Incentives, available at 
http://www.cr.nps/hps/tps/tax/. (Accessed on January 4, 2006.) 
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federal government should, in conjunction with the states, consider the aforementioned 
incentives as mechanisms to promote CIP partnering. 
 
D. THE CONTRIBUTION TO CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
PROTECTION 
This thesis’ contributes to the existing body of critical infrastructure protection 
knowledge by examining the premise that the Department of Defense is a peer security 
partner with the public and private sectors.  The conclusion refutes the commonly 
accepted belief that the concept of public-private partnering represents the overarching 
framework to protect the nation’s infrastructure, with only the collaboration of free 
enterprise and public utilities. 
The author’s fundamental objective, to emphasize the critical relationships that 
military installations share with communities throughout the United States, was 
highlighted by proposing that these are cross-domain partnerships.  Cross-domain 
partnerships, as described in this thesis, encompass the public, private, and DoD 
synchronized initiatives to secure private and federally owned and operated critical 
infrastructure.  These extended partnerships have historically relied on each other by 
virtue of the resources and community support needed when acts of terrorism or natural 
disasters debilitate a region and overwhelm local emergency management.   
Concomitantly, this thesis projects that assertive, if not aggressive, federal critical 
infrastructure guidance can promulgate an innovative framework for security 
partnerships, as opposed to the current guidance that merely recommends that sectors 
conduct partnering.  The DHS must function as the leader and facilitator of a nationally 
synchronized CIP initiative by implementing a National Infrastructure Protection Plan 
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